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Abstract. A Normative Multi-Agent System consists of autonomous agents who
must comply with social norms. Different kinds of norms make different assump-
tions about the cognitive architecture of the agents. For example, a principle-based
norm assumes that agents can reflect upon the consequences of their actions; a
rule-based formulation only assumes that agents can avoid violations. In this pa-
per we present several cognitive agent architectures for self-monitoring and com-
pliance. We show how different assumptions about the cognitive architecture lead
to different information needs when assessing compliance. The approach is val-
idated with a case study of horizontal monitoring, an approach to corporate tax
auditing recently introduced by the Dutch Customs and Tax Authority.
1 Introduction
A Normative Multi-agent System consists of autonomous agents who must comply
to social norms [3,13,6]. Normative multi-agent systems are used to design electronic
institutions [31], but can also be used to understand compliance schemes in human
society. Interesting new forms of auditing and norm enforcement are horizontal moni-
toring [15] and responsive regulation [2,4]. Such forms of auditing are based on mutual
trust and understanding, and do not only monitor compliance behaviour, but also take
the underlying motivation and corporate culture into account. This may lead to more ro-
bust compliance behaviour and can save all parties a lot of effort. However, it requires
different kinds of evidence than a traditional command and control approach. What are
the information needs for assessing compliance using such ‘horizontal’ approaches?
How a norm is adopted and followed by an agent depends on the cognitive architec-
ture of the agent. By a cognitive architecture we mean a structured model of the various
components or modules which generate the agent’s behaviour. Different ways of formu-
lating norms make different assumptions about the underlying cognitive capabilities.
For example, in the accounting profession there is a long standing debate between
advocates of rule-based and principle-based ways of formulating norms. A principle-
based formulation of norms assumes that agents can reflect upon the outcomes of their
actions; a rule-based formulation of norms only assumes that agents can follow proce-
dure. Therefore agents can ‘hide behind the rules’ and pretend not be responsible for
the consequences: “... rule-based traditions of auditing became a convenient vehicle that
perpetuated the unethical conduct of firms such as Enron and Arthur Andersen” [28].
The Sarbanes-Oxley act [27] was introduced in 2002 to avoid such accounting scandals.
Although originally a principle-based norm, in practice it has been given a rule-based
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interpretation. Our working hypothesis is that principle-based norms only work when
a subject has adequate capabilities for norm adoption and compliance. Using cogni-
tive agent architectures we hope to make such assumptions explicit. Sanctions form
another example. The use of sanctions assumes that agents ‘care’ about the negative
consequences and are actually able to adjust their behaviour. These assumptions are
not true in all cases. For instance, artificial agents typically do not ‘care’; only their
owners do. Also, when agents lack expertise to improve their behaviour, sanctions are
counterproductive. In such cases it is better to provide advice [2].
In this paper we investigate how agent architectures can account for compliance. We
discuss several cognitive agent architectures taken from the literature. We show how
the architectures can implement normative behaviour, namely by filtering or adjusting
the data structures which generate behaviour (policy, plans or goals). Moreover, we
show how different architectures lead to different information needs to assess whether
an agent is compliant. Such information needs are required for the design of ‘auditing
tools’ to support human auditors when assessing compliance of companies. Through-
out the paper we will therefore compare agent architectures to practices in the business
world. Another application is in the design of electronic institutions. There too, assump-
tions about the underlying agent architecture will influence compliance monitoring.
Consider an electronic service broker. Compare [31] for similar such applications.
There are two kinds of artificial agents: service providers and service consumers. Agents
are ‘scripts’ written in a programming language, which is run by the broker environ-
ment. The environment provides primitive actions for paying, communicating and de-
livering services. The purpose of the broker is to help consumers find providers and to
help them negotiate, implement and maintain a service level agreement. Owners of par-
ticipating agents pay a fixed membership fee and a percentage for each successful deal.
The broker tries to make sure that (owners of) agents comply with the rules of the insti-
tution, i.e. follow the protocol and honour the service level agreements. This assurance
is part of the added value of a broker. The broker must therefore monitor communi-
cations and transactions as they take place in the environment. Upon complaints or
other evidence of fraud, a human investigation may be started. The main sanction is to
evict perpetrators. However, sanctions always come after the fact. Therefore the broker
should assess the compliance attitude of the owner of a participating agent before en-
trance, and do a code review of the scripts. Our information needs analysis can be used
as a guideline for the set-up of such an assessment.
Our findings about information needs are illustrated and validated with a real life
case study of horizontal monitoring, a form of auditing recently introduced by the Dutch
Customs and Tax Authority (DTCA) [15]. The tax office relies as much as possible on
the company’s internal control system. Tax auditors only have to assess reliability of
the company’s internal control system, instead of the tax declarations themselves. This
saves the tax office a lot of effort. To participate, the company must give tax auditors
access to its records and policies. The tax office in return can give the company more
certainty, for instance that a tax declaration for a preceding year is settled. The new audit
approach requires different kinds of evidence and a different way of communicating.
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The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present three cognitive agent
architectures for compliance. In Section 3 we outline the information needs for estab-
lishing compliance. In Section 4 we present the case study on horizontal monitoring.
2 Cognitive Agent Architectures
Below we discuss a number of general cognitive agent architectures. We determine what
it means to be compliant given the capabilities offered by each architecture.
2.1 Perception and Action
The most simple agent architecture consists of two modules: perception and action [26].
These are linked in a feedback-control loop (Figure 1). Therefore this architecture is
called a reactive agent architecture. The agents behaviour is determined by a data struc-
ture called policy π: a set of situation-action pairs s → a, which specify for each pos-
sible situation s, what appropriate actions a would be. The policy is non-deterministic:
several actions may be possible in a situation. The perception module determines on
the basis of observations what situation the agent is likely to be in. Perception may be
wrong. The agent has a (limited) memory of the previous situations it has been in. These
may be called its beliefs. The action module simply executes the action suggested by
the policy. Not all actions will be successful.
If we compare this to the business world, there are similarities with the way a com-
pany is run. The daily operations are usually determined by business processes and
standardised operating procedures. Like the policy data structure, processes and proce-
dures outline for known situations what to do.
What does it mean to be compliant given this architecture? In a reactive architecture,
being compliant to a norm can in principle be implemented in two ways:
1. Adapt the perception module to send a warning signal when the next move is likely
to lead to a violation, and to send an alert when detecting an actual violation. This
is called self monitoring. Adapt the action module to suspend all actions after a
warning and undo the previous move after an alert. This is called self control.
2. Adapt the policy data-structure and filter out all situation-action pairs which are
known to lead to a violation. Depending on the computational complexity, such
readjustment can be done either immediately after a warning or an alert, or off-line.
perception
action
world
policy
control beliefs
+/-
Fig. 1. Perception and Action
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In an ideal world adjusting the policy is enough, but self monitoring and self control are
necessary when, due to inaccurate beliefs or unsuccessful actions, the agent may find
itself in or close to a violation despite the adapted policy.
The ability to monitor, evaluate and adjust future behaviour is crucial for being com-
pliant. That means we need a reflective agent: an agent who has a representation of itself
and can alter this representation in order to adjust its behaviour [22]. In Figure 1 this
function is performed by a separate control module. Adjustments are indicated with an
open arrow:−. There are many ways to implement a reflective agent; see [29] for a sur-
vey. A very basic one would make use of reinforcement learning: adjusting the policy
through signals from the environment [19]. After each action, the agent gets a rein-
forcement signal r. Violations receive a punishment (r = −1); other states get a reward
(r = 1). The agent must optimise its policy π to increase the sum of reinforcement sig-
nals over a certain period. Many algorithms can solve such optimisation problems [19].
We mention a simple one as illustration (linear reward-inaction algorithm). Let pi be the
relative likelihood of taking action ai in some given situation s according to the policy,
and let α be a learning rate (0 ≤ α ≤ 1). For all actions ai, aj which are possible in s,
if action ai succeeds (r = 1), then pi := pi + α(1 − pi) and pj := pj − αpj for j = i.
When action ai fails (r = −1), pj remains unchanged for all j.
2.2 Perception, Planning and Action
The second architecture contains an additional module: planning. This module deter-
mines by what sequence of actions the agent can best achieve its goals. Therefore, this
architecture is also called a deliberative architecture. A well known example is the BDI
architecture [25]. The planning module takes two kinds of input: (1) the information
produced by the perception module about the current state the agent is likely to be in,
enriched with background knowledge on how to interpret situations. Again, this may be
called the beliefs of the agent. (2) The desires of the agent, i.e. preferred future states of
affairs, which function as potential goals. Desires may be mutually incompatible. The
output of the planning module is the set of goals the agent has decided to pursue, and
for which a particular plan has been adopted. These adopted goals are called intentions.
Intentions must be mutually compatible. Following Pollack [24] and many subsequent
BDI architectures, we suppose each agent is equipped with a plan library with useful
recipes: pre-stored plans for different kinds of situations. When there are no recipes for
a particular goal, a new plan must be generated from first principles.
In the business world, goals would correspond to objectives of an enterprise. Desires
correspond to long term objectives, such as increasing market share or reducing time-
to-market. Intentions can be compared to those objectives which have been aligned
in a consistent strategy and for which processes, procedures and projects have been
implemented. Plans or recipes correspond to business processes and procedures (for
routine plans) or to projects (for one-off plans).
Again, such architectures are reflective: agents must be able to learn and adjust their
behaviour. So when a plan fails to achieve its goals, it must be dropped or adjusted along
with the plan library. This function is again performed by a separate control module.
Desires or goals define the success of a plan, similar to the reinforcement signals in the
previous section. The control module therefore takes goals as input.
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Fig. 2. Perception, planning and action
When we compare such reflective capabilities to the business world, the so called
Deming Cycle comes to mind: plan-do-check-act [12]. Variants of this management
control cycle are very influential in management approaches to quality control, risk
management or information security. Plan and do correspond to our planning and ac-
tion. Check (or study) refers to all kinds of learning and evaluation. This corresponds to
our perception. Act refers to making decisions: altering the plan, based on the outcome
of the evaluation. This is modelled here by the control module. Learning is also one of
the cornerstones of capability maturity models [17]. In other words: mature organisa-
tions have the ability to learn, evaluate and adjust their behaviour.
What does it mean to be compliant in a deliberative architecture? Again, we can
adjust execution by adding self monitoring and self control to the perception and action
modules, or we can adjust the data-structures which generate the behaviour. The policy
data structure is now replaced by goals and plans. In general, there are two ways of
adjusting plans and goals to address compliance: by filtering out potential violations
from existing plans and goals [23], or by adopting a norm as a new goal [6,8,13].
Filtering. We can deal with compliance in three different ways: (1) filter the plan li-
brary (no capability to violate), (2) filter the adopted plans and goals (no intention to
violate), and (3) filter the potential goals (no desire to violate). Filtering the plan library
(option 1) can be done off-line. It needs an algorithm to scan all recipes for potential
violations. Such recipes are then suppressed: they receive a special status such that they
will never be adopted. This is essentially the compliancy approach of Meneguzzi and
Luck [23], implemented in the AgentSpeak programming language.
Option 1 assumes that possible violations can be detected out of context. But in
general violations are context dependent. Consider an agent intending to “go as fast as
possible given the condition of the terrain”. We can’t decide off-line if this plan would
violate a speed limit of 30 km/h. Or consider a budget of $20. Buying fuel ($8), tires
($11) and a new mirror ($3) will add up to a violation, but it is unclear which goal con-
stitutes ‘the’ violation. Therefore potential violations need to be assessed in conjunction
with current beliefs and relevant other goals. This can be done under option 2. Option 3
suffers from a similar problem: potentially illegal desires cannot be detected off-line.
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Norm Adoption. Instead of filtering, we can also produce compliant behaviour by
adopting a norm as a source of potential goals similar to a desire. This approach is
developed by [9], see also [6,13]. Adopted norms will often correspond to maintenance
goals: goals to make sure that a desirable state of affairs subsists or that an undesirable
state is avoided, by contrast to achievement goals, which are about reaching a new state
of affairs. For example, our agent could adopt a maintenance goal to obey the speed
limit. A cognitive architecture which can deal with maintenance goals contains a kind
of feedback-control loop [16]. Similar to what we discussed in Section 2.1, trigger con-
ditions will produce a warning or an alert when the goal is likely not to be maintained
(self monitoring), which will lead to the blocking of current actions or repair actions
being executed (self control). Moreover, any new goal about to be adopted must be
filtered, to verify whether it does not conflict with current maintenance goals.
Norm adoption will often lead to conflicts. Consider an agent who is late for an ap-
pointment and must drive to as fast as possible. Which goal should get priority: keeping
the appointment (achievement goal) or obeying the speed limit (maintenance goal)? Of-
ten such conflicts will have to be resolved by the designer of the system; priorities are
build-into the agent. Our next architecture can deal with conflicts explicitly.
2.3 Perception, Goal Generation, Planning and Action
The third architecture adds a separate module for goal generation. Goal generation was
introduced by Thomason [32], who observed that until then in AI, goals were simply
given. Thomason realised that even before planning, it makes sense to filter goals. Goals
which are incompatible with current beliefs are impossible to achieve and may lead to
wishful thinking. Such goals should never even be generated. The idea was taken over
by the BOID architecture, which distinguishes between two kinds of goals: internal
motivations (desires), representing individual wants or needs, and external motivations
(obligations) to model social commitments and norms [5]. All these potential goals may
conflict with each other. New potential goals may also conflict with previously adopted
goals (intentions). To resolve conflicts among the sets of beliefs, obligations, intentions
and desires, some sort of priority order is needed. In the BOID, such a (partial) ordering
is provided by the agent type. For instance, a so called realistic agent values beliefs
over any kind of goals: B > D,B > I,B > O. This avoids wishful thinking, over-
commitment or dogmatism. A stable agent values previously adopted goals (intentions)
over new goals (desires; obligations): I > D, I > O. A selfish agent values its desires
over social obligations, D > O, whereas an obedient agent will value obligations over
desires: O > D. These orderings produce caricatures of agent behaviour. In practice,
more detailed distinctions will be necessary. For instance, a stable agent might make
an exception for life-saving obligations. The priority should be based on a classifica-
tion of goals based on their relative value for the agent. In the business world, such a
classification is often done by a risk assessment [10].
Again, the architecture is reflective: it can adjust its behaviour based on an evalua-
tion of its relative success. What does it mean to be successful? For actions and plans,
success is defined in terms of the underlying goals (desires, obligations). For selecting
one goal over another, success depends on the agent type. Agent types are basic; they
have no external motivation.
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Fig. 3. Perception, goal generation, planning and action
What does it mean to be compliant in such an architecture? All previously mentioned
ways of being compliant will work here too: self monitoring and self control, as well as
adjusting the plans and goals or even the priority order guiding decision making. Given
that resources (money, energy, time) are limited, adopting a norm as a goal means that
other goals can no longer be achieved. Norms may conflict with individual desires,
with reality, with previous intentions or with other norms. So norm adoption creates
dilemmas; it requires a form of conflict resolution. Because agents are autonomous, we
cannot ensure an agent will always adopt a norm. At least the agent should be aware of
the consequences of possible violations such as sanctions or loss of reputation. When
an agent nevertheless decides to violate a norm this should be a conscious decision.
How can dilemmas be resolved? A priority order determines how an agent will make
choices. In the BOID, priorities are fixed by agent type. In general, the relative impor-
tance of goals is linked to social values [30]. In the business world, consider values
like profit, safety, or quality. Such values are embedded in the corporate culture. For
example, a culture which values short term profits over security – as apparent from pay-
ment and incentive schemes – will be more likely to lead to behaviour which violates a
security norm, than a culture which values security over profits.
Social values may look vague, but fortunately, there has been progress in the com-
putational representation of argumentation systems based on social values, see Atkin-
son et al [1]. Decision making is a form of practical reasoning. Crucial is what counts
as a justification for an action. In a BDI architecture justification is essentially based
on goals.But how are goals justified? Social values account for the fact that people
may disagree upon an issue even though it would seem to be rational [30]. That means
that justification becomes a matter of debate. Like in legal theory, it doesn’t matter
who is right; what matters is who can construct the most convincing argument and de-
fend against counter arguments. An argument starts with a position [1]: “In the current
circumstances s, we should perform action a, to achieve consequences s′, which will
realise some goal g, which will promote some value v.” A position can be attacked
by critical questions, which seek to undermine the underlying assumptions (Table 1).
Critical questions provide a kind of quality test for the justification of a decision.
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Table 1. Critical Questions (Atkinson et al [1])
CQ1 Are there alternative ways of realising consequences s′, goal g or value v ?
CQ2 Is it possible to do action a?
CQ3 Would doing action a promote some other value ?
CQ4 Does doing action a have a side effect which demotes the value v, or some other value?
CQ5 Are the circumstances s such that doing action a will bring about goal g?
CQ6 Does goal g promote value v? Is value v a legitimate value?
CQ7 Is goal g achievable?
3 Information Needs
In this section we are concerned with the assessment of whether an agent is compliant
or not. As we have seen compliance can be realised in many different ways. To demon-
strate compliance to a norm, both subjects and auditors therefore need different kinds
of evidence, based on the underlying cognitive architecture.
1. perception, action. First, evidence of the behaviour itself, i.e. original records, data
and log-files testifying that violations did not occur. This is the only way to show
effectiveness of monitoring. Second, evidence of the policy avoiding violations, and
evidence showing that the policy is instrumental in actually producing behaviour.
This can be a review of the policy specification, or data-mining techniques dis-
covering patterns of behaviour to indicate that there is a consistency in behaviour
which suggests a policy is followed. Third, evidence of changes in behaviour af-
ter sanctions or rewards were administered. Again, this would be pattern detection,
showing that certain non-compliant patterns ease after the sanctions were applied.
2. perception, planning, action. In addition to the kinds of evidence listed above, for
deliberative agents we can also look for evidence of plans and goals being com-
pliant. Having such higher cognitive attitudes makes agents’ behaviour predictable
even in unforeseen situations. As evidence we need documentation on goals, plans
and evidence that these goals plans are actually implemented and effective in pro-
ducing behaviour.
3. perception, planning, goal generation. In addition to the kinds of evidence listed
above, now we also look for evidence of the agents’ priorities in decision making:
are obligations preferred over desires? Moreover, it must be assessed whether these
preferences are used for day-to-day decisions and do not comprise a paper reality.
Addition evidence may concern embedded social values.
How can such evidence be collected in practice? For all architectures, evidence of be-
haviour is needed. This is the only way to demonstrate effectiveness of the agent’s
internal monitoring and control. In auditing, such evidence corresponds to statistical
samples from a pool of relevant events recorded in the company’s information systems
or log-files. Note that taking samples requires that the company is collaborating. In an
electronic institution such as the service broker discussed in the introduction, we ex-
pect that log-files and traces of interaction and (relevant aspects) of transactions are
accessible for monitoring by the institution.
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For the more complex architectures, evidence about the cognitive ‘data structures’
which generate behaviour can be used in addition to evidence of behaviour. In practice,
that means evidence of policies and procedures. In auditing theory, one distinguishes
three audit aspects: design, implementation and operational effectiveness [18]. The de-
sign of a policy or procedure should guarantee that it will prevent, detect or correct
undesirable behaviour. Evidence of implementation of a policy or procedure checks
whether it has been adopted by the board, and whether employees know about it. Fi-
nally, evidence of operating effectiveness of a procedure should establish whether the
procedure was followed in all relevant cases for the period under investigation. Note
that this differs from the usual notion of effectiveness, i.e. meeting objectives. In an
electronic institution, these aspects also make sense. Auditing the design would corre-
spond to analysing the agents’ specification. Auditing implementation corresponds to
verifying the way agents have been programmed. Also the security of the electronic
environment matters, whether it prevents unauthorised modifications to agent scripts.
Auditing operating effectiveness corresponds to analysing log-files of agents behaviour.
It also depends on the continued security of the electronic environment.
To summarise, we can demonstrate compliance by:
– evidence of compliant behaviour. This can be established by logging and monitor-
ing the behaviour itself. In auditing, typically representative statistical samples are
taken from a set of records of events. Logging and monitoring are greatly enhanced
by tools for data mining and pattern recognition.
– evidence of norm implementation. This can be established by reviewing the policy
or the plans in a plan-base. In a company this amounts to interviews, dossier re-
search and reviews of documentation or board meeting minutes with the purpose
of verifying the existence of relevant business processes and standard operating
procedures. Implementation of a procedure is typically verified by a so called line
control: for one or two representative cases, follow the procedure from the “cradle
to the grave” and verify whether all relevant steps have been taken. In addition, one
needs to establish whether the procedure has been operationally effective for the
whole period (i.e. was not temporally switched off). This can be done by selecting
a representative sample of cases (e.g. incidents or events), to verify whether in all
those cases the procedure has been followed.
– evidence of norm adoption. This is hardest to establish. It means that norms have af-
fected decision making. Presence of adopted norms in the form of objectives can be
established by a dossier review combined with interviews with management (tone
at the top). For those procedures, processes and projects implemented to meet these
objectives, we must then verify the appropriateness of their design: would they in-
deed meet the objectives generated by the norm? Critical questions, similar to the
ones mentioned by Atkinson et al [1] may be used to challenge the assumptions of a
decision. Also the corporate culture may be a factor to support true norm adoption.
Discussion. One may wonder why all of this is needed. After all, evidence of an
agent’s behaviour should be enough to determine whether the agent is compliant with
the system norms. There are some reasons that evidence of norm adoption and norm
implementation may be preferred. First, determining compliance through monitoring
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behaviour may take a lot of effort. In particular, for tax monitoring, this would involve
large statistical samples from past behaviour (See Section 4). In the ‘horizontal’ ap-
proaches some of this effort is delegated to the subject of the norm. Second, log-files
can establish that behaviour is compliant, but not why. By contrast, compliance en-
forced through self regulation is said to be more robust [2]. So it makes sense to collect
evidence about the way in which norms have been adopted and implemented. Third,
monitoring behaviour can only lead to sanctions after the fact; there is no way of pro-
viding assurance beforehand. For example, in the case of the electronic service broker,
mentioned in the introduction, the broker needs to provide some kind of assurance that
agents will not violate norms. This can be done by an assessment of the intentions of
the owner (evidence of norm adoption), and a code review (evidence of norm imple-
mentation).
Principle-based versus rule-based. What can we say about the relative merits of
principle-based or rule-based formulations of a norm? To make a comparison, we first
need a concrete example of a principle and a rule. Consider the auditing principle of
‘need to know’: “only those people who need access to a document for their work,
should be given access”. When applying the principle to a specific situation, detailed
models are needed of the organisational roles assigned to people, the tasks assigned to
organisational roles, and the information needs associated with those tasks. In large en-
terprises such models are often unavailable or out of date. When they are available the
models may be too restrictive, because there is a hidden trade-off between security and
flexibility of the organisation. By contrast, a rule-based version of access control mea-
sures, would give a predefined checklist of those access rights which are not allowed for
many common organisation roles. For instance, database administrators are not allowed
to access the content of the database they manage. The problem is that a large part of
such checklists is not relevant: there may not be any database administrators. Moreover,
rules can be either too lenient or too strict for the situation. Still, rule-based norms are
much more easy to implement and monitor.
It turns out that rule-based norms can be followed by all kinds of agents, including
reactive agents. Principle-based norms, however, can only be followed by deliberative
agents. When a principle is interpreted as a general (declarative) goal, which must still
be adapted to the context, some form of planning is needed. When the principle involves
a trade-off or dilemma, some form of ethical decision making is needed.
Sanctions. What can we say about the effectiveness of sanctions as a way of enforcing
norms? For reactive agents, it is important that sanctions follow immediately after the
action that caused a violation. If there is a delay, the agent will not be able to adjust
the relative weights for the right action in the policy data-structure. For deliberative
agents, the goals (desires) are used to evaluate the success of an action or plan. Based
on this evaluation, plans may be adjusted. So to have an impact, sanctions must actually
be undesired; rewards must actually be desired. Sanctions are not necessarily monetary
fines. For example, for many companies, certainty about the financial situation is more
important than the possibility of a fine (Section 4). Empirical research among humans
has shown that external sanctions can be counterproductive [14]. In a number of day
care centres, they studied the introduction of a fine for parents being late to pick up
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their kids. After the fine was introduced, more parents were late. Apparently, they inter-
preted the fine as a kind of price, which made it morally acceptable to be late: the fine
removed their guilt. Removing the fine never restored original levels. For such reasons,
non-instrumental motivations for following a norm, such as recognition of the authority,
may lead to more robust compliance behaviour [7]. This is also one of the motivations
behind responsive regulation approaches [15,2]. Finally, sanctions assume agents have
the ability and expertise to improve their behaviour. But not all architectures have capa-
bilities for generating a plan, say, from first principles. Similarly companies often lack
expertise concerning compliance issues. So even if they have the ability to change the
do not know in which direction to change. Also in such circumstances, sanctions may
be counterproductive. It is much more effective to provide guidance and advice on how
to improve compliance [2].
4 Case Study: Horizontal Monitoring
Horizontal monitoring is introduced as the new compliance approach for tax audits
concerning company taxation by the Dutch Customs and Tax Authority (DTCA) [15].
Companies which have shown that they have a reliable ‘tax control framework’, may
voluntarily enter into horizontal monitoring. This is an auditing approach based on a
relationship of mutual trust and understanding. Consider the following text from the
brochure issued by the tax office [33]:
“Horizontal monitoring entails mutual trust between tax payer and the Tax and
Customs Administration, indicating more clearly everyone’s responsibilities
and abilities in order to do what is right, as well as laying down and observ-
ing reciprocal agreements. Horizontal monitoring is in line with developments
in society, where the individual responsibilities of corporate and government
managers and administrators are defined more clearly and upheld through su-
pervision. Businesses must be transparent for stakeholders about the degree to
which they achieve operational targets and the extent to which they are in con-
trol of the processes involved. The government is an example of a stakeholder.”
Data Collection. Our case study is in an initial stage. We are exploring hypotheses con-
cerning changing information needs. The following findings concerning the tax control
framework and the horizontal monitoring philosophy are based on two interviews with
experts of horizontal monitoring within Dutch Tax and Customs Administration, as well
as on publicly available policy documents [33]. Moreover, as part of previous research
we have conducted several interviews with experts on AEO self-assessment, a compli-
ance scheme used in customs, which is also based on Horizontal Monitoring.
The general idea of horizontal monitoring is that the tax office relies as much as pos-
sible on the company’s internal controls. This is illustrated by the audit layer model of
Dutch Tax shown in Figure 4. The model is nicknamed the ‘onion model’ because it
represents auditing effort as consecutive layers which can be peeled off. The kernel is
formed by the business processes. Reliability of the business processes is mostly estab-
lished by the internal control framework. Reliability of the internal control framework
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Fig. 4. Audit layer model (Dutch Tax and Customs Administration)
is maintained by the internal audit department of the company. The internal controls
are audited yearly by the external accountant as part of the financial audit. This means
that the tax office now only has to assess reliability of the company’s internal con-
trols, internal auditing and external auditing, rather than having to establish reliability
of the original records and business processes underlying the tax declarations. Only for
specific tax issues do tax officers need to make visits and collect full evidence. To facil-
itate such ‘meta-auditing’, the company must provide access to all kinds of information
about business processes and internal controls. The tax office in return can give the
company more certainty, for instance that a tax declaration for a certain year is settled.
Mutual trust and understanding may sound nice, but there are real changes in the
way companies are being treated. Below we list a number of illustrative changes.
1. Demonstrating to be ‘in control’. When entering into a horizontal monitoring re-
lationship, the tax office must establish the reliability of the company’s internal
control framework. This forms the basis for their ‘trust’ in the company’s record
keeping. COSO provides a well known standard for setting up an internal control
framework [10]. The standard recommends: (1) a control environment where in-
tegrity and ethical values are supported from the top management throughout the
organisation. (2) risk assessment is performed to identify and manage risks relevant
to the organisation. (3) Control activities such as policies, procedures and processes
are implemented to ensure a company carries out management directives. Examples
include approvals, verifications, reconciliations, reviews of operating performance,
security of assets and segregation of duties. (4) Relevant company data contained
in the information system should be communicated in the organisation and to the
relevant stakeholders. (5) Ongoing monitoring to assess the quality of a companys
internal control systems. When a company has implemented a control framework
like COSO it can demonstrate to the tax administration that it is in control of its
business processes.
2. No hunt for mistakes. Under the tax control framework the tax office will not try
and find as many mistakes as possible in a company’s tax declaration; given the
complexity of the legislation this is not difficult to do. Confronting a well meaning
company year after year with the mistakes they have made, is counterproductive.
Instead the tax office will try to help companies avoiding such mistakes in the
future. This involves clear communication about what is expected of a company.
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3. Open communication. Another issue regards the interpretation of the tax code. The
Dutch corporate tax – by design – contains some space for interpretation. Compa-
nies are allowed to interpret the rules in their favour. However, grossly unreasonable
interpretations are not considered acceptable. What is considered acceptable, dif-
fers from case to case. Currently, this creates uncertainty for companies. Under the
new tax control framework, companies may seek advice with their tax office, to find
out in advance whether their interpretation is considered acceptable. Such advance
information sharing can save both parties a lot of work.
4. Up to date tax assurance. In corporate taxes it is customary to audit retrospectively.
The tax officials are entitled to look back in the records to check for tax violations.
A company can be fined by the tax administration for an error that occurred a few
years ago. Resolving disputes is a long process resulting in high costs for both
parties. In horizontal monitoring the company and the tax office agree to solve all
historical issues when they start the relation. New issues are supposed to be solved
immediately when they occur. A company no longer needs to worry about past tax
issues and is assured that sanctions for historical violations will not be imposed.
These examples show that a relation based on mutual trust and understanding imposes
requirements on the interaction between both parties as well as on the internal processes
of the company. A company can demonstrate compliance by the implementation of an
internal control system and open communication of the results. We show how different
assumptions about the cognitive architecture(internal control system, ability to differ-
entiate between compliant and violating behaviour, embedded plan-do-check-act cycle)
lead to different information needs (emphasis on advice on norm interpretation instead
of norm violations, new and timely data instead of historical data, information on imple-
mentation of norms, control procedures) when assessing compliance (principle based
instead of rule based). We thus observe that a more mature agent architecture is needed
to handle the new control approach of Dutch tax.
As part of the case study, we have looked at the internal auditing guidelines used by
Dutch Tax to instruct auditors on the tax control framework [33]. It turns out that au-
ditors are instructed to use evidence regarding decision making and implementation of
decisions, in addition to the usual transaction based evidence. To demonstrate compli-
ance, evidence about the design, implementation and operational effectiveness of cog-
nitive data structures like procedures is needed. In practice this means that a company
should provide tax auditors with detailed process descriptions, working procedures as
they are implemented, and evidence that the procedures are known and applied.
5 Related Research
There is a growing body of research about compliance. We can only mention a few
works that may be of interest.
In the field of multi-agent systems, the work by Meneguzzi and Luck [23] is similar
to our work. They understand compliance as a filter of the plan library, implemented
in AgentSpeak. The norm adoption approach has been advocated both Conte and by
Dignum [8,9,13]. These architectures have influenced the BOID architecture of Sec-
tion 2.3. Moreover, we believe that any architecture for norm adoption should be able
to handle maintenance goals, see Hindriks and Van Riemsdijk [16].
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Regarding reflective programming, there has been progress on systems for automated
reconfiguration [11]. This work focuses on mechanisms for monitoring and diagnosis,
in order to reconfigure its activities. They also need a declarative specification of objec-
tives (i.e. goals) to evaluate the ‘success’ of an activity against.
Compliance can often be guaranteed by the design of business processes. Lu et al [21]
discuss how to use business process management systems (BPMs) to automatically
monitor and enforce compliance to norms and standards. Like us, this work combines
formal reasoning and the agent metaphor with the actual practice of companies.
Finally, there is an interesting parallel between our information needs and the work of
Lewicki and Bunker [20] who distinguish three sequential stages of trust. Calculus-based
trust is based on the consistency of behaviour and involves a continuous evaluation by the
actors of the punishment for violating trust and the rewards for preserving it. Knowledge-
based trust occurs when one has enough knowledge about the other party’s needs and
preferences to understand them and to predict their likely behaviour. Identification-based
trust is based on identification with the others’ desires and intentions. There is a mutual
understanding and appreciation of each others’ wants, such that parties are able to act to
the benefit and on behalf of the other.
One would expect a correspondence between the information needs for trust estab-
lishment and for assessing compliance. There are indeed many similarities, but a full
mapping is not possible. For instance, Lewicki and Bunker put adoption of the other’s
intentions and desires under identification-based trust, where we would expect this to
be part of the goal-based model. Social values or cultural cues, which we would expect
under identification-based trust, are not mentioned by Lewicki and Bunker.
6 Conclusions
Compliance of agents has mostly been discussed at the inter-agent level; however, the
intra-agent level is also important. After all, different kinds of norms make different
assumptions about the cognitive architectures of the agents who must comply with the
norm. In this paper we have tried to make such assumptions explicit by presenting three
cognitive agent architectures from the literature and by indicating in which ways com-
pliance can be implemented in these architectures. The architectures are: perception-
action, perception-planning-action and perception-goal-generation-planning-action.All
of these architectures also require reflective capabilities: to learn, evaluate and adjust
behaviour based on experience.
Conceptually, compliance can be implemented either
– by a filter, restricting cognitive ‘data-structures’ like policies, plans and goals so
that no violations will occur, or
– by norm adoption, where the norm itself is added as a goal or plan, so that the rest
of the agent architecture will ensure execution.
The cognitive architecture of an agent has an impact on the evidence needed to assess
whether the agent is compliant.
– For reactive architectures, we need log-files of behaviour, to demonstrate that the
agent behaves consistently, manages to avoid violations and seek preferred states.
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– For goal-based architectures, also evidence of the plans and goals may be used in
establishing compliance. In particular, when an agent states that it has as a goal to
be compliant, and when evidence about its plans and actual behaviour demonstrate
that the agent is ‘in control’ of its own behaviour, we may trust that the agent will
indeed behave in a compliant way.
– Finally, for value-based architectures that allow for ethical decision making, we
may also use evidence of the social values of the agent, and how they are effective
in actual decision making. However, the causal influence of stated values on actual
decisions is hard to demonstrate. Therefore, such compliance is similar to the es-
tablishment of trust. Similar to identification-based trust [20], identification of the
values of an agent may be based on cultural ‘cues’.
Regarding the debate between rule-based versus principle-based norms, principle-based
systems are much harder to implement and monitor. Principle-based systems require
that subjects and auditors have a deliberative agent architecture, and often also the
possibility to deal with trade-offs by ethical decision making. This could explain why
principle-based norm systems may degenerate into rule-based systems.
Regarding the use of sanctions, we can say that sanctions assume agents are both
willing and able to adjust their behaviour. This means that sanctions must really be un-
desired; also internal sanctions (guilt) may work. When agents lack expertise to improve
their behaviour, giving advice may be more effective than sanctions.
The analysis has been validated in a case study of horizontal monitoring, a new au-
diting approach established by Dutch Tax. This auditing approach is based on mutual
trust and understanding. It assumes companies have an interest in being compliant. Tra-
ditional command and control often works counterproductive. Instead of hunting mis-
takes in tax declarations, auditors must now give advice to companies on how to avoid
misstatements. However, because it is principle-based, horizontal monitoring assumes
that companies have an internal decision making structure which is at least goal-based
and preferably also allows for ethical decision making. The case study shows that, in
addition to evidence of behaviour, horizontal monitoring also requires evidence that
compliance issues are taken into account during internal decision making.
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